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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates whether people are equally irrational in finance and everyday 
decisions by examining the responses of a 20-question survey conducted at Pace University. Results 
from our data indicated that we could not conclude that people are more irrational in one area than 
the other.  People appear to be equally overconfident in both.  Testing for frame versus substance, 
the second set of data, the t-test signifies that people are more irrational in their finance decisions 
than they are in their everyday decisions with more than 99% certainty.  The third and final category 
of responses were tested for problem solving; in other words are people more rational in solving 
problems, such as “Monty Hall” questions, in finance or everyday?  From the t-test results we were 
not able to conclude that people are more irrational in their finance decisions than they are in their 
everyday decisions.  The tests did however confirm previous research that people, given a second 
opportunity, usually do not choose to change their first response even if by calculating the 
probability it is the more rational decision.  It seems reasonable to obtain different results for 
different decisions making traits.  On the basis of these results we conclude that although people are 
irrational in general they may be more irrational in finance or everyday depending on the irrational 
behavior being examined. 
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1I. Introduction and Literature Review 
A. Research Motivation and Design 
Twenty years ago, empirical and theoretical research in finance tended to neglect 
the human component of decision-making.  Because of recent advances in arbitrage 
pricing techniques and other powerful valuation techniques based on the assumption of 
investor rationality, some people still think that psychology and finance are two entirely 
separate fields and should not be combined.  However, extraordinary events in the recent 
past have convinced many that finance does in fact include a psychological component to 
it. There is substantial research suggesting that investors and people in general are not 
rational.  I intend to examine these issues and their implications.  The purpose of my 
study is to explore whether business students and professors exhibit rationality in their 
everyday decision-making processes to the same extent as with their investment decision-
making processes.  Research has shown that we are not rational in many of our decisions; 
my thesis seeks to examine this and to examine the difference in finance and everyday 
decision-making.  The subjects of the study are students and faculty in the Lubin School 
of Business at Pace University.  These subjects were selected at random and from a few 
specific course sections.  Survey participants were asked to complete forms consisting of 
20 questions.  The questions seem to test their knowledge of issues related to finance, 
history, art, science and miscellaneous other subjects. The responses were examined to 
determine their consistency and the extent to which subjects exhibited confidence in their 
abilities to answer the questions and to make decisions of various types.  I hope that this 
thesis will contribute to the financial literature by offering a unique perspective on the 
decision-making capabilities of investors relative to their every-day decision-making. 
2B. Introduction to Behavioral Finance 
Not too long ago the psychology of money was seen as a fascinating topic, 
primarily for psychologists, but one that may be “too interesting” for economists and one 
that may distract them “from the pervasive market forces that should be [their] principal 
concern”1. Many think that psychology and finance are two entirely separate fields and 
should not be combined.  However, the extraordinary events of the 1980’s and 1990’s, 
such as the 1987 crash and the Nasdaq bubble, have convinced many that finance does in 
fact include a psychological, a human behavior, component to it.  Behavioral finance 
thinks about financial issues with the help of ideas borrowed from psychology.  
Psychology is in part the study of human behavior, which includes perception, decision-
making, goal setting, motivation, and social interaction in addition to emotional 
expression and adjustment2. For most of us there is an intertwining of reason and 
emotion.  Money has a way of stirring emotions and clouding the decision making 
process.  Therefore, psychology does play a major role in finance. 
Much of economic and financial theory is based on the notion that individuals act 
rationally, and consider all available information in the decision-making process.  
However, research has shown that this is frequently not the case. Many examples of 
irrational behavior and repeated errors in judgment have been studied, and much 
evidence reveals “repeated patterns of irrationality, inconsistency, and incompetence in 
the ways human beings arrive at decisions and choices when faced with uncertainty” 3.
The field of behavioral finance has evolved in attempts to better understand and explain 
 
1 Miller, M.H., 1986. Behavioral rationality in finance: the case of dividends. Journal of Business 59, 267-
284 
2 Harry Gunn. Investment Euphoria and Money Madness, (New York, NY: Glenlake Publishing Company, 
Ltd, 2000, pg. IX 
3 www.investorhome.com 
3how emotions and cognitive errors influence investors and their decision-making process.  
Behavioral finance is based on the study of behavioral biases and their effects on 
financial markets, such as anomalies and inefficiencies on prices and returns.  Behavioral 
finance tries to identify and understand those biases and anomalies, and if possible use 
them in investment strategies.  Research in behavioral finance is relatively new.  Most of 
it has taken place since 1985.  
A number of researchers believe that the study of psychology can shed 
considerable light on the efficiency of financial markets as well as explain many stock 
market anomalies, market bubbles, and crashes.  Behavioral finance casts much doubt on 
the predictions of modern finance, such as the notion of efficient markets.  One of the 
most controversial topics in finance is market efficiency.  Market efficiency is 
characterized as existing when market prices reflect information.  Tests of market 
efficiency are concerned with what type of information is reflected in security prices and 
the length of time required for new information to be reflected in security prices.  There 
are three forms of market efficiency.  Traditional finance believed that market efficiency 
should hold, where as behavioral finance casts its doubt on that hypothesis.  The first 
form of market efficiency is the weak form.  The weak form efficiency is concerned with 
whether market prices reflect historical price sequences.  The second form is the semi-
strong.  The semi-strong form efficiency is concerned with whether market prices reflect 
all publicly available information.  And, the third form is the strong form.  The strong 
form efficient is concerned with whether security prices reflect all information, including 
all public and private information. 
4Weak form efficiency argues that current prices of financial assets contain all 
information that buyers and sellers have been able to obtain on the past trading of those 
assets: “their price history and past volume of trading”4. In addition this past price and 
trading information is publicly available and the cost of obtaining the information is 
negligible.  No one buyer or seller can earn above normal returns, excess profits, for the 
amount of risk taken on from trading on this historical price and volume information.  If 
this did not hold then investors would have figured out long ago how to profit from such 
historical data and asset prices would have been adjusted accordingly, eliminating further 
opportunities for above normal returns. 
 The semi-strong form efficiency argues that the current prices of financial assets 
already reflect all publicly available information affecting the value of these financial 
assets, including information about historical prices and volume, the financial condition 
and credit rating of each issuer, any published forecasts, the condition of the economy, 
and all other relevant information5. This form of efficiency assumes that all buyers and 
sellers are rational and use all publicly available information to help them value financial 
assets.  Therefore, no one buyer or seller will find opportunities for exceptional (above 
normal) profits by trading on publicly available information. 
 The third form of efficient market hypothesis is the strong form.  The strong form 
efficiency argues that the current prices of financial assets reflect all the information, both 
public and private, that is relevant to the value of financial assets.  This includes the 
information possessed by insiders, such as principal owners, officers, and senior 
 
4 Peter Rose. Money and Capital Markets, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003), Pg. 57. 
5 Ibid. 
5management of a corporation issuing the stocks or bonds.  This assumes that there is no 
asymmetric information. 
 Repeated research studies have significantly confirmed the weak and semi-strong 
form efficiency.  Few opportunities for excess returns exist based on past or present 
publicly available information.  However, the strong form efficiency is the one that has 
raised the most controversy because of the mixed research findings, especially because of 
existence of insider trading activities and the apparent presence of pockets of special 
information asymmetrically distributed throughout the financial system6.
Behavioral finance is the field of finance that proposes psychology-based theories 
to explain stock market anomalies.  Within behavioral finance it is assumed that the 
information structure and the characteristics of market participants influence individuals’ 
investment decisions as well as market outcomes.  Numerous studies have documented 
long-term historical phenomena in security markets that contradict the efficient market 
hypothesis and cannot be captured reasonably in models based on perfect investor 
rationality.  Behavioral finance attempts to fill the void.   
Behavioral finance also enlightens the area of asset pricing, where it has been 
used to interpret and/or discover empirical anomalies in the speculative dynamics of 
stock returns, such as under and overreaction to news.  In addition to that, behavioral 
finance has led the way to many detailed surveys and studies of trading behavior, through 
which a lot has been learned about the conduct of investors, analysts, and money 
managers.  Furthermore, because of behavioral finance, prospect theory offered the first 
significant alternative to the expected utility paradigm that dominated research in finance 
until then.  Prospect theory was based on experimental evidence about human behavior 
 
6 Ibid. 
6under uncertainty, and was built to fit the evidence rather than represent an abstract sense 
of rationality 7. Prospect theory relies on evidence that when making economic decisions 
people are easily influenced by framing, that is by the context and ambience that go with 
the decision problem.  Part of this context is generated by the people themselves, such as 
when they adopt arbitrary “mental accounting of their financial circumstances” 8.
Moreover, in the field of corporate finance, behavioral finance has stimulated interest in 
the factors that determine the quality of executive decision making, such as excessive risk 
aversion, unjustified optimism, hubris, and so on.  Other psychological theories that have 
been applied successfully to understanding phenomena in financial markets is through the 
extensive psychological research that has shown that people tend to be overconfident in 
their judgments.  People tend to illustrate wishful thinking bias, believing whatever it is 
they want to believe.  They also indicate problems of self-control.  People often make 
judgments using the “representative heuristic”, that is when judging the probability that a 
model is true, they base their estimate on the degree to which the data resembles the 
model, rather than do appropriate probability calculations.  In addition, they are inclined 
to exhibit “belief perseverance”, which is hanging on to past beliefs long after they 
should have been abandoned.  Individuals are apt to make the mistake of “anchoring”, 
meaning when making difficult quantitative judgments they tend to start from some 
arbitrary initial estimate and then allow that initial estimate to influence their judgments.  
People have a propensity to demonstrate availability bias, overweighing evidence that 
comes easily to mind, thereby allowing their decisions to be over-influenced by evidence 
 
7 www.cowles.econ.yale.edu 
8 Ibid. 
7that is more salient and attention-grabbing9. All of these have been major factors in 
explaining and understanding investors’ behavior and financial markets in general.  
Although many used to believe that psychology and finance really have nothing to 
do with one another, research has shown otherwise.   The psychology aspect has helped 
the area of finance tremendously, hence creating a single field of the two areas combined, 
which is known as behavioral finance.  Research in behavioral finance has essential 
applications.  The research can help guide portfolio allocation decisions, both by helping 
us understand the kinds of errors investors tend to make in managing their portfolios, as 
well as by allowing us to better understand how to discover profit opportunities for 
investment managers.  Beyond this, understating the psychological foundation of human 
behavior in financial markets “facilitates the formulation of macroeconomic policy and 
the devising of new financial institutions”10 
C. Behavioral Finance Literature Review  
A number of experiments and studies in finance have been conducted in order to 
understand investing and security markets in general.  Most financial models assume that 
all investors and all corporate executives rationally process information and seek investor 
wealth maximization.  Experiments by psychologists as well as past experience and 
observation of market behavior suggest that investors may not be entirely rational.  Many 
financial models fail when applied to the real world because of this assumption of 
investor rationality.  Anomalies such as the January effect, the small firm and P/E effects, 
the value premium effect, and many others cannot be explained with rationality-based 
 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
8financial models; however, behavioral finance might offer an alternative.  Behavioral 
finance reconsiders the rational investor assumption in light of what we know from 
experimental evidence from psychology where people tend to act irrationally.   
Experimental psychology offers many studies concerning individual and investor 
rationality.  In addition to these experimental studies, there are supporting studies based 
on statistical analyses of financial data. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman have 
conducted many pioneering experiments on subjects testing their decision-making 
characteristics.  In general all of the experiments suggest that most subjects are quite 
irrational and inconsistent in their decision-making processes.  Tversky and Kahneman 
used their results in application to financial decision-making, suggesting that investors 
may actually be very different from the theoretical “rational economic man,” which many 
financial models are based on.  For example, there is a particular type of bias to maintain 
the status quo, which is sometimes referred to as the endowment effect.  This can be seen 
in the example given in an article from the Wall Street Journal, Joe and his opera tickets: 
“On the way to the opera, Joe loses his pair of $50 tickets.  Most likely, he will not buy 
another pair, spending (a total of) $200 (including $100 on the lost tickets) to hear “La 
Boheme” seems a bit much.  But suppose, instead, he arrives at the theater tickets-in-
hand, but discovers he has lost a $100 bill.  He could sell his tickets, which would net 
him the same result as in the first case-out $100 and out the tickets.  But he probably 
won’t sell. …Joe may think he is entirely rational, but he leans consistently toward the 
status quo” (Lowenstein, June 6 1996 issue).      
The endowment effect causes losses or what is given up to weigh more 
heavily in the decision-making process than gains or what is acquired.  This is 
very applicable to finance and how people are very reluctant to sell stocks, 
particularly stocks that have lost value.  A rational investor, after considering the 
9tax write-off implications of selling stock that has lost value, would sell “losers” 
before year’s end.  However, most investors show reluctance to do so, hence 
being irrational. 
 Kahneman and Tversky also show how individuals form decisions when 
identical questions are phrased differently.  This is known as the frames vs. 
substance effect.  For example, when individuals are asked from two different 
perspectives to select from radiation or surgery for cancer treatment their 
decisions vary based on how the information is presented.  Although the 
information in the “Survival frame” is exactly the same as the information in the 
“Mortality Frame”, 18% of respondents preferred radiation therapy when 
presented with the “Survival Frame”, compared to 44% when presented with the 
“Mortality Frame”.  Therefore, not only does this show evidence that decision-
making is inconsistent, but preferences may be inconsistent and individuals 
irrational as well.  
 Most observers of the stock market agree that many market swings cannot 
be explained by substance or value.  In addition, they often argue that stocks are 
too frequently over-valued.  There is some empirical research that shows stocks 
which experience great short term price swings reverse those swings in the 
intermediate-term.  This behavior shows that investors may over-react to 
information.  Experiments by Lichtenstein, Fischoff and Phillips show that people 
have a tendency to be overconfident in their own judgments.  According to Kyle 
and Wang, some of this overconfidence may even enable overconfident traders to 
generate higher profits than their more rational counterparts.  Griffin and Tversky 
10
 
[1992] argue that experts tend to be more prone to overconfidence than novices.  
Overconfident traders tend to be more aggressive in their trading strategies, which 
may lead to the more profitable conclusion by Kyle and Wang.   
 From 1925-1997, intermediate term government bond returns have 
averaged approximately 5.2%, while stock returns have averaged 10.7%.  A 
rational investor would buy stocks over bonds, however research by Benartzi and 
Thaler shows that investors are more reluctant to invest in stocks, even though 
from almost every intermediate to long term period, investors could expect much 
more return in stocks.  Benartzi and Thaler argue that even long-term investors 
have a myopic outlook, causing them to make every effort to avoid short-term 
losses and risks.  For example, the experiments conducted by Benartzi and Thaler 
on university employees showed that when people are presented with the 30-year 
returns on stocks and bonds, they preferred to hold more stock in their pension 
plans.  However, when presented with year-by-year returns over the 30-year 
period, employees preferred to hold less stock in their plans.  Therefore, investors 
with long term strategy still have a myopic aversion to risk. 
 Experiments by Kahneman and Tversky also show that individuals tend to 
overemphasize recent information and trends and underemphasize prior 
information.  DeBondt’s research shows that even professional analysts tend to 
overreact to new information.  Arrow’s conclusion from his research suggests that 
this extreme dependence on recent information leads the market to overreact to 
new information, and may even explain the P/E ratio anomaly.  Shiller’s research 
shows that volatility in stock markets cannot be explained by the volatility of cash 
11
 
flows (dividends) associated with stocks, signifying that investors may overreact 
to risk.  
 Many experiments and much of the research in both psychology and 
finance have indicated that apparently irrational decision-making frequently 
governs actions of consumers and investors, especially in cases when losses are 
involved.  
 Applying some of the experiments from psychology to finance we see 
why some of the finance anomalies occur.  DeBondt and Thaler argue that the 
market overreacts to information and that abnormal returns can be realized by 
buying losers and selling winners.  Their study indicated that buying stocks which 
performed poorly in a prior 3-5 year period and selling those which performed 
well would have generated higher than normal returns in subsequent 3-5 year 
periods.  Most significant mean reversion tendencies seem to hold for the month 
of January.  Richards’ research shows similar results for market indices in various 
countries.  Lo and MacKinlay argue that market contrarians may generate higher 
than normal returns due to market overreactions.  They also found that the level of 
short-term inactivity displayed by stocks is inversely related to firm size.  
Therefore, if smaller firms have smaller investor followings and more restricted 
information availability, this apparent inertia might suggest that the market is 
relatively slow to react to information.  Fama and French found evidence of 
negative correlations in 3-5 year stock returns while Porteba and Summers found 
evidence of long term mean aversion in security prices.  Their results suggest that 
12
 
investors overreact to new information regarding stocks, though in the longer 
term, trends reverse as investors come to realize that they have overreacted. 
 The academic field of finance has had a behavioral side for quite some 
time.  One of the classic observations of irrational investor behavior, 
Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, goes back to the 
19th century.  In the 1930’s, John Keynes and Benjamin Graham emphasized the 
effect of investors’ emotions on stock prices.  More recently, experts like David 
Dreman published The New Contrarian Investment Strategy in 1982, which 
suggested that investors could outperform by not following market fads 11.
Behavioral finance has discovered many common behaviors, which prove that 
most investors are not so rational.  The first behavior is overconfidence.  
Overconfidence refers to our belief as human beings to think that we are smarter 
or more capable than we really are.  One study found that 90% of the car drivers 
in Sweden rated themselves as above average drivers.  Also, when people say that 
they are 90% sure of something, 90% confidence interval, studies show that they 
are right only about 70% of the time12. Overconfidence may hurt you as an 
investor when you believe you know what the next big thing is, because the odds 
are, you don’t.  Studies show that overconfident investors trade more rapidly, 
because they think they know more than the person on the other side of the trade.  
Trading rapidly costs a lot, and is rarely rewarding.  Many investors have a 
tendency to be too quick to trade.  One of Kahneman’s studies shows that when 
an investor sells one stock and immediately buys another, the one that was sold 
 
11 www.morningstar.com 
12 Ibid. 
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does better by an average of 3.4% in the following year.  People like to feel that 
they are actively improving their financial situation, but Kahneman notes “if you 
hold onto a stock for a while, your chances of making money on it are greater” 13.
The second irrational behavior that is very common among investors is mental 
accounting.  A simple example of mental accounting is when someone says they 
can’t spend a certain pool of money because they are planning to use it for their 
vacation.  Most people separate their money into segments, college education, 
retirement, money for the house, vacation, and so on.  Mental accounting becomes 
a problem when investors randomly divide the components of total return: income 
and capital appreciation14. Many investors believe that they cannot spend capital 
appreciation, that’s principal, but they can spend income.  The third common 
behavior is anchoring.  Anchoring is when you estimate the unknown based on 
what you do know.  Securities analysts often fall into anchoring.  They get 
anchored on their own estimates of a company’s earnings, or on last year’s 
earnings.  For example, if an analyst “had previously forecast that a firm would 
post quarterly earnings of $.50/share, and the firm posted actual earnings of 
$.60/share.  The analyst would then raise his forecast for next quarter earnings, 
but not by enough”15. For investors, anchoring behavior presents an 
unwillingness to part with laggard investments.  Too often investors will hold on 
to an investment waiting for it to break even.  It’s costly to hold on to losers.  The 
rational behavior would be even if you realize a loss, dump it and make new 
investments and in terms of taxes you can at least use realized loss to offset 
 
13 www.cms.psychologytoday.com
14 www.morningstar.com 
15 Ibid. 
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realized gains.  The fourth common irrational behavior investors show is 
representativeness.  This is a mental shortcut that causes one to give too much 
weight to recent evidence and too little weight to evidence from the past.  As a 
result, there is too little weight given to the real odds of an event actually 
happening.  The fifth behavior is regret.  One may not distinguish between a bad 
decision and a bad outcome.  One will feel regret after a bad outcome, even if you 
chose the investment for all the right reasons.  Regret can lead to bad sell 
decisions.  The sixth behavior has to do with fashion and fads.  Most people feel 
comfortable investing with the crowd; however research shows that such behavior 
can lead to fading performance or inappropriate investments, as everyone has 
individualized goals.  Another characteristic of irrational investors is being too 
bold.  Professional and amateur investors both have a tendency to be optimistic, 
there is a common belief that their chances are better than “the next guy’s”16.
“This bias is the foundation of the whole stock-trading industry.  Traders know 
that 50% of them must be below the median, but they all think that they’re above 
average”, says Kahneman17. Another characteristic among irrational investors is 
being too timid.  Kahneman notes that “the average investor makes bold forecasts, 
but he is also risk-averse and makes timid decisions.  His choices are unstable and 
he is quick to bail out of a situation”18. The final characteristic that Kahneman 
notes of irrational investors is being too afraid of loss.  Kahneman says, “How 
much a stock costs shouldn’t affect your decision to sell it, according to the 
traditional model, but for real investors how much they paid is very important.  
 
16 www.cms.psychologytoday.com
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
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People hang onto their losing stocks because they don’t want to feel the pain of 
admitting that they were wrong”19.
One of the classic examples of irrational behavior is the Monty Hall Problem.  
The Monty Hall problem involves a classical game show situation from the TV game 
show, Lets Make a Deal.  There are three doors, number 1, number 2, and number 3.  a 
car is behind one door, while goats are behind the other two doors.  First the player 
selects a door then the host selects a different door and opens it.  The host gives the 
player the option of switching from the original choice to the remaining closed door.  
Then the door selected by the player is opened and it’s either a car or a goat.  Those are 
the basic rules of the game.  The Monty hall problem became very controversial in the 
Ask Marilyn column of Parade magazine20. When a reader posed the question of 
whether it is to your advantage to switch or not, Marilyn’s response was that all 
contestants should switch doors because there is a 1/3 chance that car is behind door 
number 1, while 2/3 chance there is a car behind door number 2 (if the host opens door 
number 3 and it’s a goat).  The responses to Marilyn claim were all of anger claiming that 
there are equal chances that car is behind 1 or 2.  However after much statistical analysis 
that has been done on this issue as well as simply considering the fact that if the player 
switches, then he/she wins if and only if his/her first choice is incorrect, an event that 
obviously has probability of 2/3.  However, if the player never switches, then he/she wins 
if and only if his/her first choice is correct, an event with a probability of 1/3.  Although 
this seems quite obvious most people seem to stay with their first choice.  This shows that 
people are not really rational.  If they would be they would change their choice to the one 
 
19 Ibid. 
20 Source: www.ds.unifi.it/vl/vl_en/games/games6.html 
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with the better probability of winning.  Much research has shown that people are not so 
rational. 
Hersh Shefrin in his book, Beyond Greed and Fear: understanding 
Behavioral Finance and the Psychology of Investing, examines three frames of 
behavioral finance and how they are treated differently by behavioral finance 
versus traditional finance.  The first frame focuses on whether financial 
practitioners make errors because they rely on rules of thumb.  Behavioral finance 
answers yes, while traditional finance answers no.  “Behavioral finance 
recognizes that practitioners use rules of thumb called heuristics to process 
data”21. Practitioners hold biased beliefs that influence them to make errors.  
Therefore, the first behavioral theme according to Shefrin is called heuristic-
driven bias.  In contrast to behavioral finance, traditional finance assumes that 
when processing data, practitioners use statistical tools.  The second behavioral 
theme is concerned with whether form and substance influence practitioners.  By 
form, Shefrin means frame.  Behavioral finance postulates that decisions are 
based on how problems are framed.  Therefore, this behavioral theme is known as 
frame dependence.  In contrast, traditional finance assumes frame independence, 
meaning practitioners view all decisions clearly and objectively.  The third 
behavioral theme has to do with how errors and decision frames affect prices 
established in the market.  Behavioral finance argues that heuristic-driven bias 
and framing effects cause market prices to deviate from fundamental values.  
Therefore this theme is called inefficient markets.  In contrast, traditional finance 
 
21 Hersh Shefrin. Beyond Greed and Fear: Understanding Behavioral Finance and the Psychology of 
Investing, (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press, 2000) Pg. 4.    
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argues that markets are efficient.  Efficient, meaning that the price of each 
security matches its fundamental value, even if some practitioners suffer from 
heuristic-driven bias or frame dependence22.
The first frame of heuristic-driven bias, examines availability bias, 
representativeness, regression to the mean and stock market prediction, 
overconfidence and expert judgment, anchoring and adjustment, and aversion 
ambiguity.  First the availability bias, Shefrin illustrates an example of a simple 
question: Which is the more frequent cause of death in the U.S., homicide or 
stroke?  How does one go about answering the question?  Shefrin suggests that we 
answer based on what we recall.  If we can recall more homicides than strokes, 
then we answer homicides.  This rule shows principle of availability, the degree to 
which information is readily available.  “A rule based on this principle is called 
availability heuristic”23. However, heuristics, including availability heuristic, may 
be biased.  Back to the homicide, stroke question, most people tend to rely on the 
media for their information on homicides and strokes.  What if the media reports 
one cause of death more than the other, simply because one may be more 
entertaining or newsworthy than the other.  Then people who rely on availability 
heuristic may recall instances of one type of death more than the other.  
Therefore, media presents a bias to the rule based on recall.  The four statements 
that really define heuristic driven bias are as follows: 
 “People develop general principles as they find things out for themselves; 
They rely on heuristics, rules of thumb, to draw inferences from the 
 
22 Ibid. Pg. 5 
23 Ibid. Pg. 13 
18
 
information at their disposal; People are susceptible to particular errors 
because the heuristics they use are imperfect; and people actually commit 
errors in particular situations”24.
One of the most important elements affecting financial decisions is known as 
representativeness.  The principle of representativenss was proposed by 
psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1972).  Representativeness 
is about reliance on stereotypes.  A simple example Shefrin illustrates is 
predicting college GPA based on High School GPA.  People base their 
predictions of how representative a student appears to be.  Therefore, a student 
with a high GPA in High School will be seen as representative of a good student, 
whereas a student with a low GPA in High School will suffer the consequences.  
Most people will not consider that the student with a low GPA might have 
experienced some bad luck and might do much better in college.   People fail to 
“recognize regression to the mean.  Therefore, they are predisposed to making 
errors when they predict the future GPA of particular individuals”25. DeBondt 
and Thaler transferred this example into a more financial one by illustrating 
representativeness in the winner-loser effect. As mentioned earlier DeBondt and 
Thaler found that stocks that have been extreme past losers in previous three years 
do much better than extreme winners in the next three years.  Analysts tend to 
overreact in that they are much more optimistic about recent winners than they are 
about recent losers.  Overconfidence and anchoring are common problems 
examined in the decision making process.  Much research has shown that 
 
24 Ibid. Pg. 14 
25 Ibid. Pg. 16 
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practitioners demonstrate behaviors of overconfidence and anchoring all the time.  
Most people are also averse to ambiguity.  Research has shown that even people 
who are willing to gamble still prefer to play it safe and take the sure money, 
when the odds are unknown.  This phenomenon is known as the aversion to 
ambiguity.  People prefer the familiar to the unfamiliar. 
 Frame dependence is another important theme.  Frame dependence 
suggests “If you transfer a dollar from your right pocket to your left, you are no 
wealthier”26. The form used to describe a decision problem is what is known as 
the frame.  Frame independence means that form is irrelevant to the decision 
making process.  Traditional finance assumes that framing is transparent, meaning 
you can see through all the different ways a problem is described.  Behavioral 
finance suggests that many frames are not transparent in fact they are opaque.  An 
opaque frame will cause a person’s decision to be based on the particular frame 
that is used.  Therefore, a difference in form creates a difference in substance 
hence behavior reflects frame dependence.  Kanheman and Tversky provide 
evidence of frame dependence through their study of loss aversion.  When people 
are asked to choose between “1. Accepting a sure loss of $7,500, or 2. Taking a 
chance where there is a 75% chance you will lose $10,000 and a 25 % chance you 
will lose nothing (the expected loss in both cases is $7,500), most people opt for 
the latter”27. The reason being is that people hate to lose.  The uncertain option 
holds the chance that they won’t have to lose.  This is what is known as loss 
aversion.  Kahneman and Tversky found that “a loss has about two and a half 
 
26 Ibid. Pg. 23 
27 Ibid. Pg. 24 
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times the impact of a gain of the same magnitude”28. In the investor world this is 
known as “get evenitis”.  Investors will not sell anything at a loss in hopes of 
making money or at least breaking even.  Gross (1982) in his stockbroker manual, 
raises the issue of frame dependence within the context of realizing a loss.  His 
key point is that investors prefer some frames over others, this is known as 
hedonic editing29. Therefore Gross used the phrase “transfer your assets” as his 
magic selling words30. These words tend to induce the client to use a frame in 
which they reallocate their assets from one mental account to another, instead of 
closing a mental account at a loss.  Shefrin proposes that people who show frame 
dependence do so for both cognitive and emotional reasons.  “The cognitive 
aspects concern the way people organize their information, while the emotional 
aspects deal with the way people feel as they register the information”31. Self-
control is another aspect that Shefrin proposes in his frame dependence theme.  
By self-control Shefrin means being able to control ones emotions.  For example, 
some people value dividends for self-control reasons as well as for reason that 
originate from hedonic editing.  Investors tend to frame dividends as income not 
capital.  Reason being is that you are not suppose to “dip into capital.  Don’t kill 
the goose that lays the golden eggs”32. Therefore, what investors are doing is 
using frame dependence.  Frame dependence also impacts the way people deal 
with inflation, both emotionally and cognitively.  This issue is known as money 
illusion.  People’s emotional reaction is to consider nominal values, as opposed to 
 
28 Ibid. Pg. 24 
29 Ibid. Pg. 26 
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
21
 
real values.  A higher nominal value will appear more favorable then a higher real 
value to most people.  Therefore, frame dependence can have a great negative 
impact on investing in many different ways. 
 The third behavioral theme is inefficient markets.  One of the most 
controversial topics in finance is whether the market is efficient or inefficient.  
DeBondt and Thaler argue that investors who rely on the representativeness 
heuristic become overly pessimistic about the past losers and overly optimistic 
about past winners.  This heuristic-driven bias causes prices to deviate from 
fundamental value.  Therefore, past losers tend to be undervalued and past 
winners overvalued.  However, mispricing is not forever.  Over time the 
mispricing corrects itself.  Hence, losers will outperform the general market, 
whereas winners will underperform.  Another aspect of inefficient markets is 
conservatism.  Analysts who fall to conservatism due to anchoring-and-
adjustment do not adjust their earnings prediction sufficiently in response to new 
information that is enclosed in earnings announcements.  Therefore, they find 
themselves surprised by subsequent earnings announcements.  Conservatism in 
earnings predictions means that “positive surprises tend to be followed by positive 
surprises and negative surprises tend to be followed by negative surprises”33.
According to research by Bernard and Thomas (1989) stocks associated with 
recent positive earnings surprises experience higher returns than the overall 
market, while stocks associated with recent negative earnings surprises earn lower 
than the overall market.  This suggests that conservatism in analyst earnings 
 
33 Ibid. 
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predictions cause mispricing in the market34. Also research in overconfidence and 
frame dependence does suggest mispricing in the market.  However, it should be 
noted that the deviation in price from fundamental value does not automatically 
lead to risk-free profit opportunities.                
 
34 Ibid. 
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II. Methodology 
A. Methodology Overview 
The purpose of my study is to explore whether business students and professors 
exhibit rationality in their everyday decision-making processes to the same extent as with 
their investment decision-making processes.  The participants of the study were students 
and faculty in the Lubin School of Business at Pace University.  These subjects were 
selected at random and from a few specific course sections.  Survey participants were 
asked to complete forms consisting of 20 questions.  The questions appear to test their 
knowledge of issues related to finance, history, art, science and miscellaneous other 
subjects.  Each question was designed to test some kind of irrationality related to framing, 
overconfidence, and probability assessment.  The responses were examined to determine 
their consistency and the extent to which subjects exhibited confidence in their abilities to 
answer the questions and to make decisions of various types.  The questions were mixed 
up so that the respondents did not realize that some pertain to finance whereas others 
pertain to everyday decisions.  Out of the 20 questions, half pertained to finance, the 
other half dealt with everyday decisions.  There were 4 questions pertaining to 
overconfidence, 2 to probability, 3 concerning framing versus substance, and 1 recent 
versus past information question, for total of 20 questions.  All the questions seek to 
examine whether the irrational decision-making that has been indicated by various 
research holds for both finance and everyday decisions.  
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B. Survey 
Of the 20 questions that were in the survey, each played a specific role in its own 
particular category.  The categories were divided according to irrationality types as 
follows:  
1. In the overconfidence questions, if the respondents were not within the 
75% range, they were overconfident, and hence irrational.  The 
overconfidence questions are randomly distributed throughout the 
survey.  The questions relating to finance are numbers 6, 12, 13, and 15 
(see Appendix 1).  The ones relating to everyday are numbers 1, 4, 7, 
and 10.  I chose questions relating to finance and everyday that were not 
difficult to answer but ones that you were not 100% sure of. 
2. In the probability category, if the respondents changed their first choice 
after knowing that one of the three choices is worthless, they would be 
considered rational.  However, if they did not switch they were 
considered irrational, because if you assume the respondents can 
calculate probability the probability clearly shows that one should 
switch, but as research does suggest most people are persistent and will 
stay with their first choice regardless of the probability, hence showing 
irrationality.  The probability questions pertaining to finance are 
numbers16 and 17.  The ones pertaining to everyday decisions are 
numbers 2, and 3.  These questions reflect the Monty Hall experiment.  
For everyday I chose something as simple as choosing between boxes 
and for finance I did a similar scenario but with stocks.  
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3. In the past versus recent information questions, if the respondents gave 
more weight to recent information, they were considered irrational, 
because both past and more recent information should have the same 
weight.  The recent versus past information question relating to finance 
is number 18 and the one relating to everyday decisions is number 5.  I 
chose a football team to represent something random and to illustrate 
that a recent winning streak might be just as important as a past winning 
streak.  More importantly I was interested in seeing whether there was a 
consistency in giving more weight to recent information in both 
everyday and finance decisions. 
4. In the frames vs. substance questions, if the respondents chose different 
answers to the exact same questions, just framed differently, they were 
considered irrational because the substance did remain the same.  The 
frames vs. substance questions relating to finance are numbers 8, 9, 19, 
20 and the ones relating to everyday are numbers 11 and 14.  I selected 
questions such as two routes to test the respondents consistency in 
answering questions which have the exact same outcomes but are just 
phrased differently.  I did the same for finance questions, just using a 
choice of keeping or returning money which had the exact same 
outcome but depending on how it was phrased some people may select 
different answers. 
The answers of the respondents were evaluated in both (finance and everyday decisions) 
categories to see whether there is a significant difference between the two categories in 
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each of the “irrational” areas.  Once the data had been gathered, we realized it would be 
too difficult to examine irrationality in each category so the survey was divided into 
overconfidence questions and general questions, meaning questions that examined 
consistency in answering (frame versus substance).  The four overconfidence finance 
questions were numbers 6, 12, 13, and 15.  The four overconfidence everyday questions 
were numbers 1, 4, 7, and 10.  The frame versus substance finance questions were 
numbers 8, 9, and 17 and the everyday frame versus substance were numbers 3 and 11.  
Since there were three questions for finance and two for everyday, we made them equal 
by multiplying the finance responses by 2/3.  The focus of the thesis was to examine 
whether there is significant difference between peoples’ rationality in everyday and 
finance decision making.   
 
C. Research Hypotheses 
The research was divided into three separate categories, each having its own 
hypothesis and results.  Based on research discussed earlier, there are three groupings of 
irrational behaviors commonly exhibited in investing.  The general research hypothesis 
for each of the categories is that people are equally irrational in their investment decisions 
as in their everyday decisions.   Therefore, this will be the general form of each of the 
null hypotheses.   
Research Hypothesis One: 
People are equally overconfident in their everyday and finance decisions. 
HO: P1 = P2
HA: P1 R P2
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That is, the mean score for the proportion of correct answers in this category P1 for 
everyday decision-making equals the mean score P2 for financial decision-making. 
 
Research Hypothesis Two: 
With respect to framing, people are equally irrational in their everyday and finance 
decision-making. 
HO: P1 = P2
HA: P1 R P2
That is, the mean score for the proportion of correct answers in this category P1 for 
everyday decision-making equals the mean score P2 for financial decision-making. 
 
Research Hypothesis Three: 
With respect to problem solving, people are equally irrational in their everyday and 
finance decision making.   
HO: P1 = P2
HA: P1 R P2
That is, the mean score for the proportion of correct answers in this category P1 for 
everyday decision-making equals the mean score P2 for financial decision-making. 
 
D. Data 
 From a single survey we were able to gather data to test various irrationalities.  
The first group of data represents a sample of 78 participants who responded to the 
overconfidence set of questions.  Three people had to be omitted because there was 
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missing data.  One of the overconfidence questions, which participants were asked to rate 
themselves as drivers, had to be given a scale for each response.  In other words it could 
not be graded as simply right or wrong.  A scale of +1 for the below average answer, and 
zero for all other answers was assigned.  The below average response was considered to 
be the rational one. The financial question concerning how many shares of stock were 
traded on the NYSE yesterday got an overwhelmingly number of wrong answers.  It 
might have been too difficult of a question to ask college students. However, the 
participants were asked to provide a range, thus there should not have been such an 
overwhelming amount of wrong answers. For the most part people were overconfident in 
both their finance decisions as well as their everyday decisions. 
 The second set of data represents the responses for the frame versus substance 
questions.  Once again some people were omitted from the data because of missing 
responses.  The third set of data was gathered to test peoples’ problem solving ability.  
These were the Monty Hall type questions.  It was very rare to see someone actually 
make the switch from his or her initial selection in both everyday and finance questions.  
After gathering all of the data, a mean and a standard deviation were calculated.  Each 
question had an equal weight.  See Appendix 2 for all research data compiled. 
 
E. Statistical Test 
After inputting all of the responses of the survey on a spreadsheet it was necessary 
to analyze the data.  The analyses consisted of calculating the mean, standard deviation, 
and doing a t-test.  From the t-test it is apparent whether we should reject the null 
hypothesis, which is that people are just as irrational in their finance decisions as they are 
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in their everyday decisions, or fail to reject the null hypothesis.  By treating the 
overconfidence set of questions as one sample and one test and the general (frame versus 
substance) as a separate set of questions and another test, we can examine whether or not 
to accept the null hypothesis for each category and how statistically significant it is. Since 
we are unsure of whether people are more rational in finance or more rational in everyday 
decisions, we will attempt to do a two-tail test with the confidence interval of 
approximately 95%.  When a 95% confidence interval is constructed, all values in the 
interval are considered plausible values for the constraint being estimated. Values outside 
the interval are rejected as implausible. If the value of the parameter specified by the null 
hypothesis is contained in the 95% interval then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at 
the .05 level35. Hypothesis tests done by using a t-test are procedures for making rational 
decisions about the reality of effects.  
 
35 http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~lane/hyperstat/B15183.html 
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III. Results 
A. Overconfidence 
To analyze the data of the 78 participants in the survey several t-tests were 
conducted.  The t-test examined whether people were equally overconfident in their 
finance decisions as in their everyday decisions.  Our obtained t-statistic relative to the 
critical t value as well as the probability of getting our calculated t value by chance alone 
(63%), lead us to FAIL to reject the Null Hypothesis.  The probability is relatively high, 
so the means are not statistically significantly different.  Also, the t-statistic does not
exceed the critical t value therefore we cannot conclude that people are more irrational in 
their finance decisions or that they are more irrational in their everyday decisions. 
 
Table One 
 
T-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Finance Everyday 
Mean 0.346153846 0.365384615 
Variance 0.073426573 0.053071928 
Observations 78 78 
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
Df 150  
t Stat -0.477530667  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.31683969  
t Critical one-tail 1.655075501  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.63367938  
t Critical two-tail 1.975905298  
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B. Frame versus Substance 
 
To analyze the data of the 77 participants in the survey a t-test was conducted 
once again.  One participant was excluded because of missing responses.  The t-test 
examined the decision making process in finance and everyday in regards to people being 
able to identify the substance of the questions and not be fooled by its phrasing.  The 
obtained t-statistic relative to the critical t value as well as the probability of getting our 
calculated t value by chance alone (.6%), lead us to REJECT the Null Hypothesis with 
greater than 99% certainty.  The probability of chance is extremely low, so the means are 
statistically significantly different.  The t-statistic exceeds the critical t value also 
showing the means to be statistically significantly different.  Therefore we may conclude 
that people are more irrational in their finance decisions than they are in their everyday 
decisions.  The mean represents the average number of responses they got correct to the 
questions asked, hence a higher score means more rational.  Therefore a higher mean for 
everyday means people are more rational with their everyday decisions than they are with 
their finance decisions.   
 
Table Two 
 
T-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Fin Everyday 
Mean 0.406926407 0.525974026 
Variance 0.042108639 0.098000684 
Observations 77 77 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
Df 131  
t Stat -2.790824716  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.003021786  
t Critical one-tail 1.656568649  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.006043572  
T Critical two-tail 1.978238512  
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C. Problem Solving 
To analyze the data of the 81 participants in the survey a t-test was conducted 
once more.  All of the participants were included in this test because there was no 
missing data.  The t-test examined the decision making process in finance and everyday 
in regards to problem solving.  Are people more rational in their decision-making in 
problems such as the Monty Hall in finance or everyday?  Examining the t-statistic 
relative to the critical t value as well as the probability of getting our calculated t value by 
chance alone, which is 46%, lead us to FAIL to reject the Null Hypothesis.  The 
probability of chance is fairly high, so the means are not statistically significantly 
different.  The t-statistic does not exceed the critical t value also showing that the means 
are not statistically significantly different.  Therefore we may not conclude that people 
are more irrational in their finance decisions than they are in their everyday decisions.  
These questions resemble those of a Monty Hall problem.  The tests confirmed previous 
research that people usually do not choose to change their answer even if by calculating 
the probability it is the more rational thing to do.  Most people regardless of probability 
stay with their first choice.  The additional aspect of my test was to examine whether 
people are more rational in making their finance decisions or their everyday decisions.  
The tests showed that people are almost equally irrational in both cases.  There is no 
significant difference between the two. 
 
Table Three 
T-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
 
Finance Everyday 
Mean 0.209876543 0.25925926 
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Variance 0.167901235 0.19444444 
Observations 81 81 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
Df 159  
t Stat -0.73833922
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.230698372
t Critical one-tail 1.654493644
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.461396743
t Critical two-tail 1.97499503
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IV. Conclusion 
 
Each category of tests has its own results.  For overconfidence people are not any 
more rational in their everyday decisions than they are in their finance decisions.  
However, for frame versus substance, people appear to be more rational in their everyday 
decisions.  It seems reasonable to obtain different results for different decisions making 
traits.  It also seems reasonable to find that people are equally irrational because of the 
mix of people selected to participate in the study.  Although participants were chosen 
from the Lubin School of Business, it may be assumed that some people have a better 
sense of everyday material, and others are more knowledgeable in finance material.  
Therefore even if some people may be more rational in everyday, and others may be 
more rational in finance, as a whole because people are generally irrational, the 
participants were equally irrational in both finance and everyday.  Various research has 
shown much of this irrationality in each of the two categories, everyday and finance, and 
my research has confirmed it. 
The first test shows that people in general are overconfident.  Confidence only 
becomes a real problem when it becomes overconfidence.   People are overconfident in 
their own abilities, which lead to investors and analysts being particularly overconfident 
in areas where they have some knowledge.  However, from previous research increasing 
levels of confidence frequently show no correlation with greater success36. For example, 
studies show that men consistently overestimate their own abilities in many areas 
including athletic skills, abilities as a leader, and ability to get along with others.  Money 
managers, advisors, and investors are consistently overconfident in their ability to 
 
36 http://www.geocities.com/t_ride9/psychology.html 
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outperform the market, however, most fail to do so.  The simple example of the 
overwhelming majority of people, when asked, will tell you that they are outstanding 
drivers, and yet it doesn't take much thinking to realize that in every sample, at least half 
of all drivers will be below average.  The same applies for traders. “While the argument 
against the efficient market hypothesis is that the market actually doesn't process data 
very well, and that an ignorant herd do all the short-term price setting, it is interesting that 
everyone in that herd believes that they are privy to some sort of special information, 
perhaps derived from technical analysis, that enables them to out smart all the other 
investors”37. Traders by nature are often extremely confident, they see themselves in a 
rather glamorous light as entrepreneurs making money by pure brain power.  They do 
vast amounts of analysis, and forecast the market like masters, when all players think 
they have such special information, which the others do not, the result is a lot of trading.  
“Overconfidence is the basis of "irrational exuberance", the famous cautionary message 
by Alan Greenspan, and despite analysts warnings about overpriced valuations, investors 
stampeded right back into stocks”38.
In the second test the mean response was indicative of people being more rational 
in everyday decisions than financial ones.  This may have a great impact on investment 
performance and the market as whole.  Much of economic and financial theory is based 
on the notion that individuals act rationally and consider all available information in the 
decision-making process.  If this is not so, then various difficulties arise.  People may 
trade and select stocks for reasons that may not be explained by theories and models.  
 
37 http://www.travismorien.com/FAQ/psychology/overconfidence.htm 
38 Ibid. 
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This of course complicates things not only for investors, but also for the advisors, 
analysts, and institutions.  
The results of the research may have been skewed by various implications.  The 
first implications that might have had a significant affect on the outcome of the tests was 
the sample size.  Given more time, if there were 200 people or more who responded to 
the survey the results might have been more accurate.  Also, the sample size consisted of 
many more students than faculty.  If the sample would have been more equal than the 
result might have been more precise because faculty is most likely more knowledgeable 
in the finance field, but not necessarily more rational.  Just like any other survey its 
validity depends on the representativeness of the people surveyed.  One of the major 
implications that might have impacted the results of the tests was a particular class, which 
was introduced to the material such as overconfidence and frame versus substance before 
taking the survey.  Being that they were aware of being irrational, they might have 
distorted the results.  Some people also might have felt the survey was a bit too long or 
too difficult and just gave answers without giving them much thought.  Surveys have 
their limitations but they provide a relatively efficient way to gather large amounts of 
data.   
 There is a lot of research that can be done further from this simple survey.  For 
example examining whether women are more rational than men? Are professors more 
rational than students?  Focusing even more closely on some of the questions like the 
Monty Hall question and testing whether there is a significant difference between people 
selecting box 1, 2, or 3.  From my research I could see that one of the boxes was selected 
more frequently than the other two, is there anything significant about that?   
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In revising my research I would consider making 2 smaller surveys.  Shorter 
surveys may allow for more accurate responses because the participants would not have 
to answer as many questions.  There is a point where people may just start answering 
questions just to answer them.  With two smaller surveys I would consider a much larger 
sample size so that the responses are representative.  I believe this would greatly improve 
the results. 
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Appendix 1 
Survey Form: 
 
Directions:  Please fill in the blank or circle one of the answers in each question. 
 
1. What year was the Chrysler Building built? Pick a range within which you 
believe there is a 75 % probability that your answer is right. 
lower end of date range ____________________          
upper end of date range ____________________ 
2. If you had a choice between box numbers 1, 2, or 3, and two of the boxes were 
worth nothing, but one was worth $1 Million, which box number would you 
choose?  
1 2 3
3. If you now know that one of the 3 boxes is worth nothing, would you change your 
1st choice or stay with it?  
Change Choice  Stay with choice in Question #3 
4. What year was the Mona Lisa painted? Pick a range within which you believe 
there is a 75 % probability that your answer is right. 
lower end of date range ____________________          
upper end of date range ____________________ 
5. If football team “A” lost 10 games, but has now won the last 3 games, and 
football team “B” won 10 games and has now lost the last 3 games. Which team 
would you bet on if Team “A” competes against Team “B”? 
A B
6. What is MSFT (Microsoft) trading at?  Pick a range within which you believe 
there is a 75 % probability that your answer is right. 
lower end of price range ____________________          
upper end of price range ____________________ 
7. How would you rate yourself as a driver?  
Below average  average   above average  N/A 
8. Suppose that you have been given $8,000 to keep.  You now have to choose 
between returning $2,000 and tossing a coin. If you choose to toss a coin and you 
toss a head, you must give back $4,000; if you toss a tail, you keep all $8,000. Do 
you choose to give back $2,000 or toss the coin? (1st case sure win 6k, 2nd either 4 
or 8) 
Give back $2,000  Toss a coin 
9. "Could you comfortably save 20 percent of your income at this point in your 
life?"  
Yes  No 
10. What is the cruising altitude of a Boeing 747?  Pick a range within which you 
believe there is a 75 % probability that your answer is right. 
lower end of altitude range _________________    (in feet or meters)     
upper end of altitude range _________________    (in feet or meters) 
11. You embark on what could be a16 hour trip.  If you take route A, you are 
guaranteed to save 2 hours from your trip.  Instead, if you pick route B, it is 
equally likely that you would either save 4 hours or save no hours.  Which route 
do you choose? 
Route A  Route B 
12. What is today’s rate on a 15 year T-Bill? Pick a range within which you believe 
there is a 75 % probability that your answer is right. 
lower end of  % range ____________________          
upper end of  % range ____________________ 
13. What did the Dow close at yesterday? Pick a range within which you believe 
there is a 75 % probability that your answer is right. 
lower end of range ____________________          
upper end of range ____________________ 
14. You start a trip that should take you approximately 12 hours.  If you take the 1st 
route your trip is guaranteed to be 14 hours, however if you take the 2nd route, it 
will take an extra 4 hours or nothing extra (12 hour trip).   Which route do you 
choose 1st or 2nd?
1st Route  2nd Route 
15. How many shares of stock were traded on the NYSE yesterday? Pick a range 
within which you believe there is a 75 % probability that your answer is right. 
lower end of range ____________________          
upper end of range ____________________ 
16. You have a choice between stock X, stock Y, and stock Z. Which one would you 
choose? 
X Y Z
17. One of the stocks is now worthless, would you stay with the one you already 
chose or change your stock? 
Change Choice  Stay with choice in Question #16 
18. Stock “A” has been performing well in the past three years, but is now declining, 
Stock “B” has been performing poorly the past three years but is now increasing, 
which stock would you invest in?  
Stock A  Stock B 
19.  Could you comfortably live on 80 percent of your income today? 
Yes   No 
20. You are given $4,000 to keep.  In addition you either get $2,000 more or toss a 
coin.  If you toss a coin, heads is an additional $4,000, if you get tails you get no 
additional money. (So, in first case you get sure $6,000, second case either $4,000 
or $8,000 depending on coin result). 
Take $2,000  Toss a coin 
 
Appendix 2 
Data: 
Overconfidence Questions 
 
FIN: #6, 12, 
13, 15 Mean SD 
Everyday: 
#1, 4, 7, 10 Mean SD 
Person  1 0.00 0.34 0.27 0.25 0.36 0.22926 
2 0.00   0.25   
3 0.50   0.75   
4 0.25   0.25   
5 0.25   0.00   
6 0.00   0.50   
7 0.00   0.50   
8 0.50   0.25   
9 0.00   0.75   
10 0.00   0.25   
11 0.25   0.50   
12 0.00   0.50   
13 0.00   0.50   
14 0.50   0.75   
15 0.50   0.75   
16 0.25   0.25   
17 0.25   0.50   
18 0.50   0.50   
19 0.75   0.25   
20 0.50   0.00   
21 0.50   1.00   
22 0.50   0.00   
23 0.00   0.25   
24 0.00   0.00   
25 0.00   0.50   
26 0.75   0.25   
27 0.50   0.50   
28 0.25   0.25   
29 0.25   0.50   
30 0.25   0.50   
31 0.50   0.50   
32 0.25   0.25   
33 0.25   0.25   
34 0.25   0.50   
35 0.25   0.25   
36 0.50   0.50   
37 0.25   0.25   
38 0.00   0.25   
39 0.25   0.25   
40 0.50   0.50   
41 0.75   0.50   
42 0.25   0.25   
43 0.25   0.50   
44 0.75   0.25   
45 0.00   0.00   
46 0.75   0.50   
47 1.00   0.75   
48 0.00   0.00   
49 0.75   0.25   
50 0.50   0.50   
51 0.75   0.75   
52 0.75   0.25   
53 0.00   0.50   
54 0.25   0.25   
55 0.75   0.25   
56 0.25   0.75   
57 0.00   0.50   
58 0.25   0.50   
59 0.50   0.50   
60 0.25   0.50   
61 0.00   0.00   
62 0.50   0.75   
63 0.50   0.00   
64 0.00   0.00   
65 0.25   0.50   
66 0.50   0.25   
67 0.25   0.25   
68 0.75   0.25   
69 0.00   0.25   
70 0.00   0.00   
71 0.50   0.25   
72 0.50   0.50   
73 0.25   0.50   
74 0.50   0.00   
75 0.25   0.00   
76 0.25   0.50   
77 0.50   0.25   
78 1.00   0.25   
79 0.75   0.50   
 
General, Frame versus Substance Questions 
 
Fin: #8,9,17 * 2/3 Mean SD 
Everyday: 
#3,11 Mean SD 
Person  1 0.67 0.44 0.41 0.20 0.50 0.53 0.311025
2 0.33 0.22   0.50   
3 0.33 0.22   0.50   
4 0.67 0.44   0.50   
5 1.00 0.67   0.00   
6 0.67 0.44   1.00   
7 1.00 0.67   1.00   
8 0.33 0.22   0.50   
9 1.00 0.67   1.00   
10 0.67 0.44   1.00   
11 1.00 0.67   1.00   
12 0.00 0.00   0.50   
13 0.33 0.22   0.50   
14 1.00 0.67   1.00   
15 0.33 0.22   0.50   
16 1.00 0.67   1.00   
17 1.00 0.67   0.50   
18 1.00 0.67   1.00   
19 1.00 0.67   1.00   
20 1.00 0.67   1.00   
21 0.33 0.22   0.50   
22 0.33 0.22   0.50   
23 1.00 0.67   0.50   
24 0.67 0.44   1.00   
25 0.33 0.22   0.50   
26 0.67 0.44   0.50   
27 0.67 0.44   0.00   
28 0.00 0.00   0.00   
29 0.00 0.00   0.50   
30 0.33 0.22   0.50   
31 0.33 0.22   0.50   
32 0.00 0.00   0.50   
33 0.00 0.00   0.50   
34 0.33 0.22   0.50   
35 0.67 0.44   0.50   
36 0.67 0.44   0.50   
37 0.33 0.22   0.50   
38 1.00 0.67   0.50   
39 1.00 0.67   1.00   
40 0.67 0.44   0.00   
41 0.67 0.44   0.50   
42 1.00 0.67   0.50   
43 0.67 0.44   0.00   
44 0.67 0.44   1.00   
45 0.67 0.44   0.50   
46 0.67 0.44   0.50   
47 0.00 0.00   1.00   
48 0.00 0.00   0.50   
49 1.00 0.67   0.50   
50 0.33 0.22   0.50   
51 0.67 0.44   0.00   
52 0.67 0.44   1.00   
53 1.00 0.67   1.00   
54 0.67 0.44   0.50   
55 0.67 0.44   0.50   
56 0.67 0.44   0.50   
57 0.67 0.44   0.00   
58 0.67 0.44   0.50   
59 0.67 0.44   0.50   
60 0.67 0.44   0.50   
61 0.67 0.44   0.00   
62 1.00 0.67   1.00   
63 0.33 0.22   0.50   
64 0.33 0.22   0.50   
65 0.67 0.44   0.50   
66 0.67 0.44   0.00   
67 1.00 0.67   0.50   
68 0.33 0.22   0.00   
69 0.33 0.22   0.50   
70 0.67 0.44   0.00   
71 0.67 0.44   0.50   
72 0.33 0.22   0.00   
73 1.00 0.67   0.00   
74 0.67 0.44   0.50   
75 1.00 0.67   0.50   
76 0.33 0.22   0.50   
77 0.67 0.44   0.50   
78 0.67 0.44   0.50   
 
Problem Solving Questions 
 
Everyday Mean SD Fin Mean SD 
Person  1 0 0.207317 0.407879 1 0.268293 0.445797
2 0 0
3 0 0
4 0 0
5 0 0
6 0 0
7 0 0
8 0 1
9 0 1
10 0 0
11 0 0
12 0 0
13 1 0
14 0 0
15 0 0
16 0 0
17 0 0
18 1 0
19 0 0
20 0 0
21 0 0
22 0 0
23 0 1
24 0 0
25 1 1
26 0 1
27 1 1
28 0 0
29 1 1
30 1 0
31 0 0
32 1 1
33 0 0
34 0 0
35 0 0
36 0 0
37 0 0
38 0 0
39 0 0
40 0 0
41 0 0
42 0 0
43 0 0
44 0 0
45 1 0
46 0 1
47 1 1
48 0 0
49 0 0
50 0 1
51 0 0
52 1 1
53 0 0
54 0 1
55 1 0
56 0 0
57 0 0
58 1 1
59 0 0
60 1 1
61 1 1
62 0 0
63 0 0
64 0 0
65 0 0
66 0 0
67 0 0
68 0 0
69 1 1
70 0 0
71 0 0
72 0 0
73 0 0
74 1 1
75 0 0
76 0 1
77 0 0
78 0 0
79 0 0
80 0 1
81 1 0
82 0 1
